The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Affect, risk, and decision making.
Abstract
Risk is perceived and acted on in 2 fundamental ways. Risk as feelings refers to individuals' fast, instinctive, and intuitive reactions to danger. Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on risk management. Reliance on risk as feelings is described with "the affect heuristic." The authors trace the development of this heuristic across a variety of research paths. The authors also discuss some of the important practical implications resulting from ways that this heuristic impacts how people perceive and evaluate risk, and, more generally, how it influences all human decision making. Finally, some important implications of the affect heuristic for communication and decision making pertaining to cancer prevention and treatment are briefly discussed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
(1994) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 10,542
Slovic, P. (1987) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.3563507 · Cited by 9,271
Self-citationJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151 · Cited by 8,094
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.127.2.267 · Cited by 6,503
(1999) · Cited by 6,104
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267 · Cited by 5,955
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Shafer, G. R., Kahnerman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288362 · Cited by 5,657
Self-citationThe empirical case for two systems of reasoning.
Sloman, S. A. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.119.1.3 · Cited by 3,848
Cited by
Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows
HARTZMARK, S. M., & SUSSMAN, A. B. (2019) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12841 · Cited by 1,711
Lipkus, I. M. (2007) · Medical Decision Making · doi:10.1177/0272989x07307271 · Cited by 771
Visualizing Uncertainty About the Future
Spiegelhalter, D., Pearson, M., & Short, I. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1191181 · Cited by 682
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2005) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00426.x · Cited by 588
Age and gender differences in risky driving: The roles of positive affect and risk perception
Rhodes, N., & Pivik, K. (2011) · Accident Analysis & Prevention · doi:10.1016/j.aap.2010.11.015 · Cited by 553
Metadata
- Authors
- Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L., & MacGregor, D. G.
- Venue
- Health Psychology
- Published
- 2005
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4, Suppl
- Pages
- S35-S40
- ISSN
- 0278-6133 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-7810
- OpenAlex
- W2114782137
- Cited by
- 1,041
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 14.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Affect, risk, and decision making. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/0278-6133.24.4.s35
- The paper
- Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L., & MacGregor, D. G. (2005). Affect, risk, and decision making. Health Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-6133.24.4.s35
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
