The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game
Open accessAbstract
This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significantly different from the traditional “political business cycle.” Reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationA Political Model of the Business Cycle
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Cited by
Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles
JULIO, B., & YOOK, Y. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01707.x · Cited by 2,126
Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles
Rogoff, K. (1987) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2428 · Cited by 1,877
Fuerst, T. S., & Walsh, C. E. (1999) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061160 · Cited by 1,690
Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies
Roubini, N., & Sachs, J. D. (1989) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(89)90002-0 · Cited by 1,363
Voting for autocracy: hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-4695 · Cited by 1,155
Metadata
- Authors
- Alesina, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987-08
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 651
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2146991276
- Cited by
- 1,322
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 59.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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