The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts
Abstract
The paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory. A two-period, single-good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long-term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs. The result that long-term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs. The main features of equilibrium are that (risk-neutral) firms will insure (risk-averse) workers against downside risk, yielding downward rigid wages. Wages are not fully rigid (as in earlier work on contract theory) because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them. The firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period. The resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance. Workers gain from long-term contracts in comparison to spot markets; whereas owners may not. In the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long-term contracts.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Harris, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297359 · Cited by 812
Self-citationInformal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
Ligon, E., Thomas, J. P., & Worrall, T. (2002) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00204 · Cited by 653
Human Capital, Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure
BERK, J. B., STANTON, R., & ZECHNER, J. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01556.x · Cited by 599
Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 1909–2006*
Philippon, T., & Reshef, A. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs030 · Cited by 521
Thomas, J., & Worrall, T. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297404 · Cited by 436
Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets
Malcomson, J. M. (1986) · Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559594.011 · Cited by 335
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413 · Cited by 56
(1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Holmstrom, B.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1983
- Volume
- 98
- Pages
- 23
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1561047547
- Cited by
- 175
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 40.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.