The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets
Abstract
This paper presents a simple, general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect information. By identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out, the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are Pareto improving. The approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained Pareto optima. It can also lead to simple tests, based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection, signaling, moral hazard, incomplete contingent claims markets, and queue rationing equilibria.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Self-citationEquilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885326 · Cited by 4,987
Self-citationThe design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation
Atkinson, A. B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1976) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(76)90041-4 · Cited by 1,719
Self-citationOptimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production Eficiency
Diamond, P. A., & Mirrlees, J. A. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,043
A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
Wilson, C. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7 · Cited by 1,035
Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules
Diamond, P. A., & Mirrlees, J. A. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 948
Information and Competitive Price Systems
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1976) · Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University) · doi:10.7916/d8959tj2 · Cited by 921
Self-citationA Near-Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia
Akerlof, G. A., & Yellen, J. L. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/100.supplement.823 · Cited by 890
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Pauly, M. V. (1974) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881793 · Cited by 707
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884469 · Cited by 678
Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay
Harberger, A. C. (1971) · Journal of Economic Literature · Cited by 588
THE ROLE OF A STOCK MARKET IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH TECHNOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY
DIAMOND, P. A. (1978) · Uncertainty in Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-214850-7.50020-6 · Cited by 530
Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Braverman, A. (1982) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d85b0cgv · Cited by 439
Self-citationImplicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885377 · Cited by 235
Investment Under Private Ownership: Optimality, Equilibrium and Stability
Drèze, J. H. (1974) · Allocation under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-01989-2_9 · Cited by 188
Employment With Asymmetric Information
Azariadis, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885378 · Cited by 113
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Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Buzz: face-to-face contact and the urban economy
Storper, M., & Venables, A. J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Geography · doi:10.1093/jnlecg/lbh027 · Cited by 2,616
Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?
Kirman, A. P. (1992) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.6.2.117 · Cited by 1,595
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
Self-citationInformation and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136363 · Cited by 1,455
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Greenwald, B. C., & Stiglitz, J. E.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1986-05
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 229
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2080184288
- Cited by
- 1,353
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 59.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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