The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Abstract
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Citations
Cited by
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
Carlsson, H., & van Damme, E. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951491 · Cited by 1,535
Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge
Brandenburger, A., & Dekel, E. (1993) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1993.1012 · Cited by 443
Modeling Rational Players: Part II
Binmore, K. (1988) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267100000328 · Cited by 346
“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties
Nachbar, J. H. (1990) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753708 · Cited by 272
Metadata
- Authors
- Pearce, D. G.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1984-07
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1029
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2143284884
- Cited by
- 1,407
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1911197
- The paper
- Pearce, D. G. (1984). Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911197
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
