The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties
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Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Nielsen, R. P., & Axelrod, R. (1985) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/257983 · Cited by 6,321
(2015) · Adversarial Risk Analysis · doi:10.1201/b18653-3 · Cited by 3,632
Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics
Taylor, P. D., & Jonker, L. B. (1978) · Mathematical Biosciences · doi:10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9 · Cited by 3,450
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and Linear Algebra
(1974) · Pure and Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/s0079-8169(08)x6044-1 · Cited by 3,091
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938316 · Cited by 1,804
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Pearce, D. G. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911197 · Cited by 1,407
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J.-F. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912320 · Cited by 1,397
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
Bernheim, B. D. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911196 · Cited by 1,291
Cited by
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743
Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
Ritzberger, K., & Weibull, J. W. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171774 · Cited by 470
Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets
Sandholm, W. H. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2696 · Cited by 448
Metadata
- Authors
- Nachbar, J. H.
- Venue
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Published
- 1990-03
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 59-89
- ISSN
- 0020-7276 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1270
- OpenAlex
- W1980125776
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 33.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Nachbar, J. H. (1990). “Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties. International Journal of Game Theory. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01753708
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
