The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
Abstract
The purpose of this note is to show that the so-called Principle of Minimum Differentiation, as based on Hotelling’s 1929 paper “Stability in Competition” is invalid. The purpose of this note is to show that the so-called Principle of Minimum Differentiation, as based on Hotelling’s 1929 celebrated paper (Hotelling [3]), is invalid. Firstly, we assert that, contrary to the statement formulated by Hotelling in his model, nothing can be said about the tendency of both sellers to agglomerate at the center of the market. The reason is that no equilibrium price solution will exist when both sellers are not far enough from each other. Secondly, we consider a slightly modified version of Hotelling’s example, for which there exists a price equilibrium solution everywhere. We show however that, for this version, there is a tendency for both sellers to maximize their differentiation. This example thus constitutes a counterexample to Hotelling’s conclusions. We shall first recall Hotelling’s model and notations. On a line of length `, two sellers A and B of a homogeneous product, with zero production cost, are located at respective distances a and b from the ends of this line (a+ b ≤ `; a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0). Customers are evenly distributed along the line, and each customer consumes exactly a single unit of this commodity per unit of time, irrespective of its price. Since the product is homogeneous, a customer will buy from the seller Econometrica, 47(5), 1145–1150, September 1979. Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Hotelling, H. (1990) · The Collected Economics Articles of Harold Hotelling · doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-8905-7_4 · Cited by 5,677
Price competition, quality and income disparities
Gabszewicz, J. J., & Thisse, J. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90041-3 · Cited by 1,070
Self-citationSequential Location among Firms with Foresight
Prescott, E. C., & Visscher, M. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003293 · Cited by 518
Cited by
Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation
Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1982) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297136 · Cited by 1,958
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. W. (1987) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116710 · Cited by 1,611
Mullainathan, S., & Shleifer, A. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825619 · Cited by 1,180
Economics of Agglomeration: Cities, Industrial Location, and Globalization
Fujita, M., & Thisse, J.-F. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139051552 · Cited by 1,111
Self-citationEconomic Geography and Public Policy
Ottaviano, G., Robert-Nicoud, F., Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., & Martin, P. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400841233 · Cited by 987
Product and Price Competition in a Duopoly
Moorthy, K. S. (1988) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.7.2.141 · Cited by 808
Platform competition: Strategic trade‐offs in platform markets
Cennamo, C., & Santalo, J. (2013) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2066 · Cited by 780
The Economics of Product Variety: A Survey
Lancaster, K. (1990) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.9.3.189 · Cited by 718
Exploring the Implications of M-Commerce for Markets and Marketing
Balasubraman, S., Peterson, R. A., & Jarvenpaa, S. L. (2002) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1177/009207002236910 · Cited by 683
Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
Caplin, A., & Nalebuff, B. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938239 · Cited by 664
Balasubramanian, S. (1998) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.17.3.181 · Cited by 549
On the Analytical Dimension of Proximity Dynamics
Shaw, A. T., & Gilly, J.-P. (2000) · Regional Studies · doi:10.1080/00343400050006087 · Cited by 495
Quality Segmentation in Spatial Markets: When Does Cannibalization Affect Product Line Design?
Desai, P. S. (2001) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.20.3.265.9767 · Cited by 463
Determinants of demand for green products: An application to eco-label demand for fish in Europe
Brécard, D., Hlaimi, B., Lucas, S., Perraudeau, Y., & Salladarré, F. (2009) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.07.017 · Cited by 443
Gimeno, J., & Woo, C. Y. (1996) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.7.3.322 · Cited by 427
Chapter 58 Agglomeration and economic geography
Ottaviano, G., & Thisse, J.-F. (2004) · Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0080(04)80015-4 · Cited by 404
Self-citationThe Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity
de Palma, A., Ginsburgh, V., Papageorgiou, Y. Y., & Thisse, J.-F. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912653 · Cited by 371
Self-citationA monopolistic competition model of spatial agglomeration
Fujita, M. (1988) · Regional Science and Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/0166-0462(88)90007-5 · Cited by 368
Contracting in space: An application of spatial statistics to discrete-choice models
Pinkse, J., & Slade, M. E. (1998) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(97)00097-3 · Cited by 350
Price Competition and Product Differentiation When Consumers Care for the Environment
Conrad, K. (2005) · Environmental & Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-004-6977-8 · Cited by 345
Competition in Multi-characteristics Spaces: Hotelling Was Almost Right
Irmen, A., & Thisse, J.-F. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2348 · Cited by 328
Self-citationReward Programs and Tacit Collusion
Kim, B.-D., Shi, M., & Srinivasan, K. (2001) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.20.2.99.10191 · Cited by 321
Content and advertising in the media: Pay-tv versus free-to-air
Peitz, M., & Valletti, T. M. (2008) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.08.003 · Cited by 304
Private label positioning: Quality versus feature differentiation from the national brand
CHANCHOI, S., & COUGHLAN, A. (2006) · Journal of Retailing · doi:10.1016/j.jretai.2006.02.005 · Cited by 293
Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly
Economides, N. (1986) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(86)90124-2 · Cited by 259
Analytical Differences in the Economics of Geography: The Case of the Multinational Firm
McCann, P., & Mudambi, R. (2005) · Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space · doi:10.1068/a37311 · Cited by 237
Bohlmann, J. D., Golder, P. N., & Mitra, D. (2002) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.48.9.1175.175 · Cited by 180
Personalized pricing and advertising: Who are the winners?
Esteves, R.-B., & Resende, J. (2019) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.11.003 · Cited by 38
Vertical Outsourcing and Location Choice
Lin, Y.-J., & Tu, K.-I. (2013) · Procedia Economics and Finance · doi:10.1016/s2212-5671(13)00058-0 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- d'Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Thisse, J.-F.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1979-09
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1145
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2052864322
- Cited by
- 1,868
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 15.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.