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Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
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Citations
Cited by
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The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Maskin, E. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00076 · Cited by 1,180
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Self-citationRoth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,004
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E. (1979) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297045 · Cited by 809
Incentives and incomplete information
d'Aspremont, C., & Gérard-Varet, L.-A. (1979) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(79)90043-4 · Cited by 795
The Possibility of Social Choice
Sen, A. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.3.349 · Cited by 763
The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
Hylland, A., & Zeckhauser, R. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260757 · Cited by 549
Information and the Coase Theorem
Farrell, J. (1987) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.1.2.113 · Cited by 399
Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., & Riedl, A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1335 · Cited by 373
SEN, A. (1993) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042106 · Cited by 355
Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions
Leonard, H. B. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261158 · Cited by 352
A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Falkinger, J., Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Winter-Ebmer, R. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.247 · Cited by 338
Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner’s Dilemma
Gracia-Lázaro, C., Ferrer, A., Ruiz, G., Tarancón, A., Cuesta, J. A., Sánchez, A., & Moreno, Y. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1206681109 · Cited by 343
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview
Roth, A. E. (1988) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233717 · Cited by 336
Sequential contributions to public goods
Varian, H. R. (1994) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(94)90019-1 · Cited by 325
Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
Hurwicz, L. (1979) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297046 · Cited by 308
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Tideman, T. N., & Tullock, G. (1976) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260505 · Cited by 306
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Runge, C. F. (1984) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130438 · Cited by 290
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Morgan, J. (2000) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00153 · Cited by 285
Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions
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Roth, A. E. (2020) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5.5 · Cited by 268
SOME NOTES ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVE‐SIGNALLING MODELS, ACTIVITY CHOICE AND RISK PREFERENCES
Ross, S. A. (1978) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02018.x · Cited by 86
Reischmann, A., & Oechssler, J. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.009 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Groves, T., & Ledyard, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1977-05
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 783
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2004263125
- Cited by
- 823
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 93.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.