The Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision in dynamic settings — Theory and experimental evidence
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Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders, observe who is trustworthy, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels.
“Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders19, observe who is trustworthy20, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels21,22.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [22]
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- Authors
- Reischmann, A., & Oechssler, J.
- Affiliations
- Heidelberg University (DE)
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-03
- Volume
- 159
- Pages
- 104-115
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2793211407
- Cited by
- 12
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 1.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- University of Heidelberg
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- public goods, voluntary contribution mechanism, repeated games, better response dynamics, Pareto optimality, incomplete information, heterogeneous valuations, contribution rate, mechanism design
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