Cited by 12Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Voting SystemsGame Theory and Applications

The Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision in dynamic settings — Theory and experimental evidence

Reischmann, Andreas, Oechssler, Joerg·2018·Journal of Public Economics

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.009

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25 of 25 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders, observe who is trustworthy, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels.

    “Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders19, observe who is trustworthy20, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels21,22.”

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Authors
Reischmann, A., & Oechssler, J.
Affiliations
Heidelberg University (DE)
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2018-03
Volume
159
Pages
104-115
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2793211407
Cited by
12
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1
FWCI
1.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
University of Heidelberg
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
public goods, voluntary contribution mechanism, repeated games, better response dynamics, Pareto optimality, incomplete information, heterogeneous valuations, contribution rate, mechanism design

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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