The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
Abstract
We develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs. Each firm enters the market knowing its own cost, but not that of its opponent. As times goes on, each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival. The time of exit is the only strategic variable, so that our model is a of attrition. In contrast to the classic war of attrition, however, we assume that with positive probability each firm's costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy. Thus our model, unlike the classic one, has a unique equilibrium.
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Cites
Nash, J. F. (1950) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907266 · Cited by 7,840
Selection and the Evolution of Industry
Jovanovic, B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912606 · Cited by 4,515
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320 · Cited by 988
ENTRY, GIBRAT'S LAW, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH OF FIRMSPreprint
Mansfield, E. (1961) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 677
Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Competition in Patent Races
Stiglitz, J. E., Fudenberg, D., Gilbert, R. J., & Jean Tirole, Z. (1983) · European Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d8r21bbj · Cited by 586
Self-citationCutthroat Competition and the Long Purse
Telser, L. G. (1966) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466627 · Cited by 329
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90075-3 · Cited by 217
Self-citationStrong evolutionary equilibrium and the war of attrition
Riley, J. G. (1980) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(80)90244-1 · Cited by 87
Asymmetric equilibria in the war of attrition
Nalebuff, B., & Riley, J. G. (1985) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(85)80036-9 · Cited by 74
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Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Working Capital and Fixed Investment: New Evidence on Financing Constraints
Fazzari, S. M., & Petersen, B. C. (1993) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555961 · Cited by 907
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555717 · Cited by 465
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1986-07
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 943
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1987806401
- Cited by
- 322
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 27.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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