The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Abstract
The first-order approach to principal-agent problems involves relaxing the constraint that the agent choose an action which is utility maximizing to require instead only that the agent choose an action at which his utility is at a stationary point. Although more mathematically tractable, this approach is generally invalid. This paper identifies sufficient conditions-the monotone likelihood ratio condition and convexity of the distribution function condition-for the first-order approach to be valid. The Pareto-optimal wage contract is shown to be nondecreasing in output under these same conditions. MIRRLEES [5] WAS THE FIRST to point out that the standard method for analyzing the principal-agent problem is not generally correct. This method, the so-called first-order approach, involves weakening the constraint that the agent choose a utility-maximizing action to require instead only that the agent choose an action at which his utility is at a stationary point. The resulting problem is more mathematically tractable. However, as Mirrlees [5] has shown, necessary conditions for a contract to solve the first-order program are not generally even necessary conditions for the valid program. Therefore qualitative propositions about the nature of the Pareto-optimal contract derived from the first-order approach are not in general valid. This has motivated researchers to try to identify classes of cases where the first-order approach is valid.
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Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Cited by
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
Relational Incentive Contracts
Levin, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157115 · Cited by 1,099
Contracting theory and accounting
Lambert, R. A. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00037-4 · Cited by 1,050
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Innes, R. D. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-s · Cited by 923
Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation
Banker, R. D., & Datar, S. M. (1989) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491205 · Cited by 875
Metadata
- Authors
- Rogerson, W. P.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1985-11
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1357
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2080220927
- Cited by
- 868
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 21.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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