The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Abstract
We consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion. The optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of N accounts which count the number of times that each of the N kinds of observable events occurs. The number N is independent of the number of time periods, so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation. In a continuous time version of the problem, the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent, small random fluctuations. The solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule. If the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates, such as revenues, costs, or profits, the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates. The combination of exponential utility, normal distributions, and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do, as we illustrate. We interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent's strategy space, which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated, nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates.
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Citations
Cites
Convergence of Probability Measures
Billingsley, P. (1999) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9780470316962 · Cited by 13,910
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Self-citationGood News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Self-citationDeterministic and Stochastic Optimal Control.
Bather, J. A., Fleming, W. H., & Rishel, R. (1976) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2344363 · Cited by 2,690
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Rogerson, W. P. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913212 · Cited by 868
Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study
Bull, C., Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K. (1987) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261439 · Cited by 493
Cited by
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Self-citationManagerial incentives and risk-taking☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004 · Cited by 2,909
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/516389 · Cited by 2,290
Financial accounting information and corporate governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00027-1 · Cited by 2,283
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49 · Cited by 1,764
Metadata
- Authors
- Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1987-03
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 303
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2106580408
- Cited by
- 2,859
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 24.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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