The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Approach to Communication Equilibria
Abstract
The Nash equilibrium concept may be extended gradually when the rules of the game are interpreted in a wider and wider sense, so as to allow preplay or even intraplay communication. A well-known extension of the Nash equilibrium is Aumann's correlated equilibrium, which depends only on the normal form of the game. Two other solution concepts for multistage games are proposed here: the extensive form correlated equilibrium, where the players can observe private extraneous signals at every stage and the communication equilibrium, where the players are furthermore allowed to transmit inputs to an appropriate device at every stage. We show that the set of payoffs associated with each solution concept has a canonical representation (in the spirit of the revelation principle) and is a convex polyhedron. We also provide for each concept a super-canonical game such that the set of payoffs associated with the solution concept is precisely the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of this game.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Cass, D., & Shell, K. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261139 · Cited by 985
11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
Kuhn, H. W. (1953) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II · doi:10.1515/9781400881970-012 · Cited by 913
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4 · Cited by 912
Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
Holmstrom, B., & Myerson, R. B. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912117 · Cited by 670
Moulin, H., & Vial, J. P. (1978) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01769190 · Cited by 227
28. Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games
Aumann, R. J. (1964) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400882014-029 · Cited by 217
A two-person game of information transmission
Green, J. R., & Stokey, N. L. (2006) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.007 · Cited by 124
Gérard‐Varet, L., & Moulin, H. J. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90059-5 · Cited by 30
Cited by
Voice matters in a dictator game
Yamamori, T., Kato, K., Kawagoe, T., & Matsui, A. (2008) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9168-y · Cited by 324
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. (1991) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7 · Cited by 127
Tennenholtz, M. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.002 · Cited by 52
Metadata
- Authors
- Forges, F.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1986-11
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1375
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2160912374
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 7.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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