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Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
Abstract
Successful deterrence, it is argued, requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender's credibility without provoking a potential attacker. Hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended-immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty-eight historical cases. The empirical results indicate that (1) the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence; (2) a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success; and (3) a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure.
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Cites
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Jervis, R. (2017) · doi:10.1515/9781400885114 · Cited by 3,199
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Metadata
- Authors
- Huth, P. K.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-06
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 423-443
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2123417927
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 39.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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