The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model
Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that in international disputes, a state's military threast are more likely to work the more the state is favored by the balance of power or the balance of interests. Analysis of a game-theoretic model of crisis signaling substantially refines and revises this claim. Due to selection effects arising from strategic behavior, measures of the relative strength of a defender's interests that are available before a crisis begins (ex ante) should be related to the failure of the defender's threats during the crisis. Ex ante measures of the defender's relative military strength should correlate with the success of the defender's crisis threats, but due to strategic dynamics that are not grasped by the standard arguments. A reanalysis of Huth and Russett's data on immediate deterrent threats lends support for these and other hypotheses drawn from the game-theoretic treatment.
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Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 16,171
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Jervis, R. (2017) · doi:10.1515/9781400885114 · Cited by 3,199
Schelling, T. C. (1966) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · doi:10.4324/9781315814803-17 · Cited by 1,446
American political science review
(1983) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(83)90139-7 · Cited by 839
Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises
Snyder, G. H., & Diesing, P. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400871186 · Cited by 569
de Mesquita, B. B., & Lalman, D. (1992) · Cited by 484
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights
Gochman, C. S., & Maoz, Z. (1984) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002784028004002 · Cited by 481
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining
Morrow, J. D. (1989) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111116 · Cited by 358
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1984) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010184 · Cited by 343
Models of strategic choice in politics
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-0581 · Cited by 334
Cited by
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Smith, A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585485 · Cited by 458
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation
Reed, W. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669294 · Cited by 275
Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen
Reiter, D. (1995) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539227 · Cited by 200
Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy
Sechser, T. S., & Fuhrmann, M. (2016) · doi:10.1017/9781316227305 · Cited by 155
Metadata
- Authors
- Fearon, J. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1994-06
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 236-269
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2115574315
- Cited by
- 403
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 50.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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