The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Structural Dependence of the State on Capital
Abstract
A central claim of both Marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society. This is the theory of “structural dependence of the state on capital.” Using a formal model, the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined. We conclude that in a static sense the theory is false: virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place. Yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense. Policies that, once in place, redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented.
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Citations
Cites
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Schumpeter, J. A., & Keynes, J. M. (1936) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2278703 · Cited by 14,485
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Self-citationPolitics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems.
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Cited by
Young, I. M. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0198297556.001.0001 · Cited by 3,250
The New Politics of the Welfare State
(2001) · doi:10.1093/0198297564.001.0001 · Cited by 3,228
Political Regimes and Economic Growth
Przeworski, A., Limongi, F., & Giner, S. (1995) · Democracy and Development · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-24076-0_1 · Cited by 1,056
Self-citationPolitical Regimes and Economic Growth
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1993) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.7.3.51 · Cited by 954
Self-citationPower through, over and in ideas: conceptualizing ideational power in discursive institutionalism
Carstensen, M. B., & Schmidt, V. A. (2016) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2015.1115534 · Cited by 693
Metadata
- Authors
- Przeworski, A., & Wallerstein, M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-03
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 11-29
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2002470573
- Cited by
- 625
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 29.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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