The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Regimes and Economic Growth
Abstract
Arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights, pressures for immediate consumption, and the autonomy of dictators. While everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights. The main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption, which reduces investment. Only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them, and democratic states are not. The main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output. These views are summarized in turn.
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Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
North, D. C. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808678 · Cited by 32,691
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization
Wade, R. (1990) · doi:10.1515/9780691187181 · Cited by 4,835
Industrial Policy in an Export-Propelled Economy: Lessons from South Korea's Experience
Westphal, L. E. (1990) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.4.3.41 · Cited by 386 · cited 1×
“Observing Brazil in 1988, we discover that it was a democracy which declined at the rate of 2.06 percent. Would it have grown had it been a dictatorship? The information we have, the observation of Brazil in 1988, does not answer this question. But unless we know what would have been the growth of Brazil in 1988 had i…”
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Cited by
The end of the transition paradigm
Carothers, T. (2002) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0003 · Cited by 2,700
Barro, R. J. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250107 · Cited by 1,746
The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings
Brunnschweiler, C. N., & Bulte, E. H. (2008) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.004 · Cited by 1,121
Institutions for high-quality growth: What they are and how to acquire them
Rodrik, D. (2000) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/bf02699764 · Cited by 1,020
Jensen, N. M. (2003) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818303573040 · Cited by 1,017
Metadata
- Authors
- Przeworski, A., Limongi, F., & Giner, S.
- Venue
- Democracy and Development
- Publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
- Published
- 1995
- Pages
- 3-27
- OpenAlex
- W2118144184
- Cited by
- 1,056
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 310.46
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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