The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action
Abstract
A basic problem for a rational choice theory of rebellious collective action is to explain why average citizens would participate in such behavior, since they have nothing to gain (they will receive benefits of successful rebellion, in terms of public goods, regardless of whether they take part or not), but much to lose (rebellious behavior may be quite costly). According to the conventional private interest or “by-product” theory, the incentive to participate must come from the expectation of receiving selective benefits; but since average citizens in a general case cannot expect substantial private material rewards, the relevant selective benefits must be psychological in nature. In contrast to the model of private interest theory, a public goods model is proposed, stipulating that the value of rebellion in terms of public goods can be a relevant incentive for participation. Using data from surveys conducted in New York City and Hamburg, West Germany, we investigate the relationship between participation in rebellious political behavior and measures of the incentives of public goods and private interest. The results do not support predictions of the private interest model in regard to nonmaterial selective incentives. Hypotheses of the public goods model are supported.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
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Collier, P., Elliot, V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., & Sambanis, N. (2003) · PsycEXTRA Dataset · doi:10.1037/e504012013-001 · Cited by 2,431
Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945
Franklin, M. N., Eijk, C. V. D., Evans, D., Fotos, M., Hirczy de Mino, W., Marsh, M., & Wessels, B. (2004) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511616884 · Cited by 1,421
Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Muller, E. N., & Opp, K.-D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1986-06
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 471-487
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2138057253
- Cited by
- 531
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 59.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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