The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance
Abstract
In numerous crises after World War II--Berlin, Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and the Middle East--the United States resorted to vague threats to use nuclear weapons in order to deter Soviet or Chinese military action. On a few occasions the Soviet Union also engaged in nuclear saber-ratling. Using declassified documents and other sources, this volume examines those crises and compares the decisionmaking processes of leaders who considered nuclear threats with the commonly accepted logic of nuclear deterrence and coercion. Rejecting standard explanations of our leader's logic in these cases, Betts suggests that U.S. presidents were neither consciously blufffing when they made nuclear threats, nor prepared to face the consequences if their threats failed. The author also challenges the myth that the 1950s was a golden age of low vulberability for the nted Stateas and details how nuclear parity has, and has not, altered conditions that gave rise to nuclear blackmail in the past.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Fearon, J. D. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944796 · Cited by 2,360
(2018) · National and International Security · doi:10.4324/9781315184517-8 · Cited by 1,238
The Renaissance of Security Studies
Walt, S. M. (1991) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600471 · Cited by 1,074
The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use
Tannenwald, N. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899550959 · Cited by 782
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model
Fearon, J. D. (1994) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002794038002004 · Cited by 403
Metadata
- Authors
- Treverton, G. F., & Betts, R. K.
- Venue
- Foreign Affairs
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1987
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 431
- ISSN
- 0015-7120 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1975735215
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 123.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/20043389
- The paper
- Treverton, G. F., & Betts, R. K. (1987). Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Foreign Affairs. https://doi.org/10.2307/20043389
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.