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Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, E. A., & Pape, R. A.
- Venue
- Foreign Affairs
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 139
- ISSN
- 0015-7120 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2496413804
- Cited by
- 656
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 75.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.