Cited by 355Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesSocial and Intergroup PsychologyEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

“In-Group Love” and “Out-Group Hate” as Motives for Individual Participation in Intergroup Conflict: A New Game Paradigm

Halevy, Nir, Bornstein, Gary, Sagiv, Lilach·2008·Psychological Science

Abstract

What motivates individual self-sacrificial behavior in intergroup conflicts? Is it the altruistic desire to help the in-group or the aggressive drive to hurt the out-group? This article introduces a new game paradigm, the intergroup prisoner's dilemma-maximizing difference (IPD-MD) game, designed specifically to distinguish between these two motives. The game involves two groups. Each group member is given a monetary endowment and can decide how much of it to contribute. Contribution can be made to either of two pools, one that benefits the in-group at a personal cost and another that, in addition, harms the out-group. An experiment demonstrated that contributions in the IPD-MD game are made almost exclusively to the cooperative, within-group pool. Moreover, preplay intragroup communication increases intragroup cooperation, but not intergroup competition. These results are compared with those observed in the intergroup prisoner's dilemma game, in which group members' contributions are restricted to the competitive, between-group pool.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02100.x

Cites

46 of 46 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Recent behavioral research using economic games suggests that ingroup love plays a key role in driving economic punishment towards the outgroup.

    “Recent behavioral research using economic games suggests that ingroup love plays a key role in driving economic punishment towards the outgroup (Halevy et al., 2008; De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy et al., 2012).”

    From A neurobiological association of revenge propensity during intergroup conflict (2020) · cites this paper as Halevy et al., 2008

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Halevy, N., Bornstein, G., & Sagiv, L.
Affiliations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem (IL)
Corresponding author
Halevy, Nir
Venue
Psychological Science
Published
2008-04
Volume
19
Issue
4
Pages
405-411
ISSN
  • 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9280
OpenAlex
W2100789707
Cited by
355
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 5
FWCI
36.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Keywords
intergroup conflict, in-group cooperation, intergroup competition, intragroup communication, altruism, aggression
MeSH terms
Adult, Conflict, Psychological, Female, Hate, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Love, Male, Motivation

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review