The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses
Abstract
Cooperation among nations has become the focus of a wide range of studies in the past decade. The recent international relations literature about cooperation has adopted a distinct approach. It has tended to focus on the systemic level of analysis. It has also used game theory as its central tool of analysis. This review evaluates this literature, arguing that these methodological choices have contributed to both the greatest strengths and the greatest weaknesses of the literature in explaining cooperation among nations. The recent literature on international cooperation has made two general contributions. First, it has developed a concept of cooperation, which can help distinguish what behavior counts as cooperation and which has been adopted widely in thefield.Second, the literature ha* tried to illuminate the conditions under which cooperation is likely to emerge. Using game theory to model relations at the systemic level parsimoniously, scholars have developed at least six hypotheses about the circumstances that promote cooperative behavior. The recent literature also suffers from at least two serious problems. The first problem flows from the assumptions used to generate the relatively parsimonious hypotheses. In particular, the way in which the assumption of anarchy is used causes problems. Second, and relatedly, the literature shows a remarkable neglect of domestic politics. As will be argued, this poses a serious limitation for understanding cooperation. Systemic theory simply cannot take us far enough. The international-level hypotheses depend on implicit theories about internal politics. Hypotheses about domestic influences on cooperation among states are not well developed. Although systemic theory has been touted for a variety of reasons, the biggest gains in understanding international cooperation in the future are likely to come from domestic-level theories.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Milner, H.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 1992-04
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 466-496
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W2075126551
- Cited by
- 476
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 110.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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