The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On Indeterminate Probabilities
Abstract
Some men disclaim certainty about anything. I am certain that they deceive themselves. Be that as it may, only the arrogant and foolish maintain that they are certain about everything. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider how judgments of uncertainty discriminate between hypotheses with respect to grades of uncertainty, probability, belief, or credence. Discriminations of this sort are relevant to the conduct of deliberations aimed at making choices between rival policies not only in the context of games of chance, but in moral, political, economic, or scientific decision making. If agent X wishes to promote some aim or system of values, he will (ceteris paribus) favour a policy that guarantees him against failure over a policy that does not. Where no guarantee is to be obtained, he will (or should) favor a policy that reduces the probability of failure to the greatest degree feasible. At any rate, this is so when X is engaged in deliberate decision making (as opposed to habitual or routine choice).
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Citations
Cites
Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability.
Levi, I., & Jeffrey, R. C. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184531 · Cited by 392
Self-citationKoopman, B. O. (1940) · Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society · doi:10.1090/s0002-9904-1940-07294-5 · Cited by 205
Cited by
Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making
G�rdenfors, P., & Sahlin, N.-E. (1982) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00486156 · Cited by 325
Joyce, J. M. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00194.x · Cited by 295
Dorst, K. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918498 · Cited by 108
Justifying precautionary policies: Incommensurability and uncertainty
Aldred, J. (2013) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.10.006 · Cited by 36
Ensemble-based Uncertainty Quantification: Bayesian versus Credal Inference
Shaker, M., & Hüllermeier, E. (2021) · Proceedings - 31. Workshop Computational Intelligence : Berlin, 25. - 26. November 2021 · doi:10.58895/ksp/1000138532-5 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Levi, I.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1974-07-18
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 13
- Pages
- 391
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W185930641
- Cited by
- 543
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 82.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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