The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Synergy, Agency, and the Determinants of Premia Paid in Mergers
Abstract
Hypotheses about the creation of value by mergers are tested on premia paid in a sample of one hundred recent acquisitions. The premia increase with financial, although not with real, synergies and with the scope for "managerial" behavior in the target firms. The acquirers' willingness to pay also increases with their scope for managerial behavior. The presence of either actual and potential rival bidders has a powerful effect, and the authors ascertain that market gains (losses) to acquirers' shareholders do not distort the associations between acquisition premia and sources of value. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Cites
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Cited by
Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris
Hayward, M. L. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (1997) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393810 · Cited by 1,787
Network Learning: The Effects of Partners' Heterogeneity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions
Beckman, C. M., & Haunschild, P. R. (2002) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3094892 · Cited by 881
Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2011) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0001839211427534 · Cited by 636
Graebner, M. E., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2004) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/4131440 · Cited by 566
Haunschild, P. R. (1994) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393296 · Cited by 430
Metadata
- Authors
- Slusky, A. R., & Caves, R. E.
- Venue
- The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-03
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 277
- ISSN
- 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2082637107
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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