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Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrinsic Values
Abstract
Pain and pleasure are among the strongest candidates for unconditional, intrinsic values, one phenomenon bad and another good in every instance. When pondering the problem of evil, theologians regularly focus on pain, both physical and emotional. Pain is a felicitous example, since in itself pain seems self-evidently, indisputably, objectively bad; some people see evil in the essential nature of pain and suffering. We pity pain's victims, condemn its perpetrators, complain about it, combat it any way we can; 'pain' is rooted in 'poena' -'punishment'. Pleasure is fundamental to living well. Pleasure, even slight, seems good, which is one reason we love beauty, humor, music, and other innocent sources of pleasure. Even J. L. Mackie and J. P. Sartre, who insist that value cannot be built into an object, assume that in itself, simply through being what it is, pain is bad and pleasure good.'
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Citations
Cited by
Dancy, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199270023.001.0001 · Cited by 1,677
Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism
Feldman, F. (2004) · doi:10.1093/019926516x.001.0001 · Cited by 591
The problem of defective desires
Heathwood, C. (2005) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400500338690 · Cited by 282
HAYBRON, D. M. (2001) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00072.x · Cited by 73
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldstein, I.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1989-12
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 255
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2007086400
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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