The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
Abstract
We analyze a model of interest group influence where this influence arises from a group's ability to provide relevant information to political actors about regulatory performance. The model rests on three premises: (I) bureaucrats possess an informational advantage, vis-à-vis their political overseers, concerning policy relevant variables; (2) this informational advantage is potentially exploitable by the agency; and (3) politicians anticipate this exploitation and adapt to it in their design of agencies. We show that a major consequence of this anticipation and adaptation is service to organized interest groups.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationThe Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
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Cited by
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
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Bureaucracy and Service Delivery
Pepinsky, T. B., Pierskalla, J. H., & Sacks, A. (2017) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051215-022705 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Banks, J. S., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-05
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 509
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2328001391
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 15.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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