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Cited by 346

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome

Bawn, Kathleen·1993·American Journal of Political Science

Abstract

Institutions determine the results of social decision processes, yet institutions are themselves endogenous products of earlier social choices. This paper explores the hypothesis that participants in the choice of institutions seek alternatives that favor their desired policies. The choice of institutions can be analyzed in terms of bargaining between individuals or parties, where preferences derive from preferences over policy and bargaining is structured by existing institutions. This approach is used to study the choice of an electoral system in Germany after World War II. The hypothesis that parties choose electoral institutions to maximize their future policy influence explains both the adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the switch to a two-vote ballot in 1953.

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Metadata

Authors
Bawn, K.
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1993-11
Volume
37
Issue
4
Pages
965
ISSN
0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2060635549
Cited by
346
References
15
FWCI
16.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2111539
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Bawn, K. (1993). The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111539

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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