The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome
Abstract
Institutions determine the results of social decision processes, yet institutions are themselves endogenous products of earlier social choices. This paper explores the hypothesis that participants in the choice of institutions seek alternatives that favor their desired policies. The choice of institutions can be analyzed in terms of bargaining between individuals or parties, where preferences derive from preferences over policy and bargaining is structured by existing institutions. This approach is used to study the choice of an electoral system in Germany after World War II. The hypothesis that parties choose electoral institutions to maximize their future policy influence explains both the adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the switch to a two-vote ballot in 1953.
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Cites
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Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
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Cited by
Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy
Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Listhaug, O. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199276382.001.0001 · Cited by 820
Governance in a Partially Globalized World
Keohane, R. O. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401000016 · Cited by 407
Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions
Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610875 · Cited by 366
Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions
Carey, J. M. (2000) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/001041400003300603 · Cited by 304
Internationalization, institutions, and political change
Garrett, G., & Lange, P. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300028460 · Cited by 302
Metadata
- Authors
- Bawn, K.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-11
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 965
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2060635549
- Cited by
- 346
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 16.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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