The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
Abstract
This paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position-taking incentives of parties and candidates. It seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems-or to show the limits of such extension. The factors examined are the district magnitude, the electoral formula, the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast, whether voters can cumulate their votes, and whether voters can partially abstain. I suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives. Among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives, at least in noncumulative systems, are the following: increases in the number of votes per voter; outlawry of partial abstention; and decreases in the district magnitude. In systems allowing the cumulation of votes, matters are a bit different.
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Cites
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Hotelling, H. (1990) · The Collected Economics Articles of Harold Hotelling · doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-8905-7_4 · Cited by 5,677
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws
Groennings, S., & Rae, D. W. (1968) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/446528 · Cited by 1,766
(2010) · When Political Parties Die · doi:10.5040/9798216034957.ch-002 · Cited by 990
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957393 · Cited by 731
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
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Bernhardt, M. D., & Ingerman, D. E. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90028-3 · Cited by 296
Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition
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Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108595841 · Cited by 2,986
The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?
Iversen, T., & Cusack, T. R. (2000) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100016567 · Cited by 892
Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., & Glasgow, G. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00199.x · Cited by 709
Dalton, R. J. (2008) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414008315860 · Cited by 742
Metadata
- Authors
- Cox, G. W.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-11
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 903
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079694060
- Cited by
- 869
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 47.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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