The DOI matches its Crossref record; 150 of the 150 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions
Abstract
Because of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.
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Cites
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The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy
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CEDERMAN, L.-E., HUG, S., SCHÄDEL, A., & WUCHERPFENNIG, J. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055415000118 · Cited by 221
Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool
Berry, C. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00344.x · Cited by 128
Beyond Marble Cakes and Picket Fences: What U.S. Federalism Scholars Can Learn from Comparative Work
Weissert, C. S. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381611000855 · Cited by 22
Moffitt, S. L., Willse, C., Smith, K. B., & Cohen, D. K. (2023) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592721002012 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2004-01-12
- OpenAlex
- W985495116
- Cited by
- 366
- References
- 150
- FWCI
- 32.33
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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