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Noncompliance in Environmental Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the Law?
Abstract
Theory: An increasingly common regulatory tool is one that delegates the duty to provide information to the regulated entities, creating new problems in principalagency models of regulation. Hypotheses: Failure to comply with regulations mandating information provision is as much due to ignorance of reporting requirements as to willful evasion. Methods: A modified detection controlled estimation model for coverage, violation, and detection of facility compliance with the EPA's Toxics Release Inventory, estimated for facilities in Minnesota in 1991. Results: Violation is better understood by those variables associated with the likelihood that the firm is ignorant of TRI reporting requirements, than by those associated with evasion. Firms in violation tend to be small facilities, releasing or transferring small amounts of toxins to the environment.
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Citations
Cited by
Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms' Regulatory Compliance
Potoski, M., & Prakash, A. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00120.x · Cited by 649
Policy Implementation, Street-level Bureaucracy, and the Importance of Discretion
Tummers, L., & Bekkers, V. (2014) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2013.841978 · Cited by 535
Inequality at Birth: Some Causes and Consequences
Currie, J. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.3.1 · Cited by 443
Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection
Khanna, M., Quimio, W. R. H., & Bojilova, D. (1998) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1006/jeem.1998.1048 · Cited by 431
Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy
Cohen, M. A. (1999) · The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 1999/2000 · doi:10.4337/9781035365913.00009 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Brehm, J., & Hamilton, J. T.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1996-05
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 444
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2319030958
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 33.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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