Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 189

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying

Austen-Smith, David, Wright, John R. · 1996 · American Journal of Political Science

Abstract

Introduction In Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), we developed a formal model to study the pattern of lobbying and influence when two rival groups contend to affect the voting behavior of a legislator over a given pair of alternatives. Subsequently, in Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), we analyzed comparative static results derived from that model. Our analysis focused on the relationship between the decision to lobby by two groups, A and B, and the prior probability, p, that the legislator favors a particular alternative from the given pair of alternatives. The comparative statics imply that, ceteris paribus, if p is less than .5, so that the legislator is expected to vote against A's interests and in favor of B's, then: (1) the decision of A to lobby the legislator depends on p but is independent of the decision of B; (2) if A does not lobby the legislator, then neither will B; and (3) if A does lobby, then B lobbies when p is sufficiently high. We termed (3) counteractive lobbying. Intuitively the idea is that when legislators' prior positions are changeable (i.e., when p is sufficiently greater than zero or less than one), then we should observe interest groups actively lobbying to change the positions of legislators aligned against them; and under these conditions, we should also observe groups aligned with the same legislators lobbying to counter the potential influence of their rivals. We tested this prediction, along with results (1) and (2), in AustenSmith and Wright (1994) with data drawn from the lobbying efforts of organizations on Robert Bork's nomination to the United States Supreme Court. Since different legislators can be associated with different values of p-the probability of voting for or against Bork prior to any lobbying activity-our three hypotheses are cross-sectional statements about the pattern of lobbying across legislators. We emphasize that (1)-(3), along with the conditions under which they occur, are implications, not assumptions, of the model. Baumgartner and Leech (1996) contend that we specified our theoretical and empirical models incorrectly, coded our variables improperly, based

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2111637

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 189

Metadata

Authors
Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. R.
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1996-05
Volume
40
Issue
2
Pages
543
ISSN
0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2322228735
Cited by
189
References
0
FWCI
25.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2111637
The paper
Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. R. (1996). Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111637

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.