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Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z
Abstract
Theory: A pre-voting, nonpartisan adaptation of Snyder's (1991) vote-buying and Groseclose's (1995) favor-trading theories implies that significant cosponsorship and discharge-petition behavior will be concentrated in the middle of the ideological spectrum, independent of legislators' partisan affiliations. Hypotheses: Bill cosponsorship should be a primarily preference-based phenomenon. Waffling-defined as bill cosponsorship but refusal to sign a discharge petition for the bill-should be negatively associated with preference extremity and unaffected, at the margin, by majority party membership. Methods: Probit analysis of individual-level data. Measures of legislators' preferences electoral margin, seniority, committee membership, and party are used to predict pattems of cosponsorship and waffling on the A to Z spending plan in the 103rd House of Representatives. Findings: Consistent with the adapted Snyder/Groseclose hypotheses, cosponsorship and waffling are explained primarily by preferences, somewhat by membership on money committees, and only slightly by partisanship.
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Citations
Cited by
Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791123 · Cited by 1,134
Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-4315 · Cited by 910
Party Polarization in Congress
Theriault, S. M. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790652 · Cited by 656
Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks
Fowler, J. H. (2006) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpl002 · Cited by 532
Legislative cosponsorship networks in the US House and Senate
Fowler, J. H. (2006) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2005.11.003 · Cited by 330
Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House
KOGER, G. (2003) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298003x200872 · Cited by 295
Kessler, D., & Krehbiel, K. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082608 · Cited by 261
Self-citationSmith, S. S. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511812613 · Cited by 261
Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll‐Call Ideal Points
ALEMÁN, E., CALVO, E., JONES, M. P., & KAPLAN, N. (2009) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298009787500358 · Cited by 125
“Krehbiel (1995), for instance, maintains that “legislators cosponsor measures whose anticipated policy consequences they like relative to the status quo, and they choose not to cosponsor measures whose anticipated policy consequences they dislike relative to the status quo” (910).”
BackgroundLeech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Krehbiel, K.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-11
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 906
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2005145043
- Cited by
- 187
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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