The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Interest Groups' Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone
Abstract
Theory: The benefits of coalitional advocacy in a crowded group environment, and the organization maintenance costs imposed on groups that seek to work as part of alliances are used to develop a model of organized interests' decisions to join alliances or work alone. Hypotheses: Organizations estimate whether an alliance is likely to improve their chances for success relative to working alone. The forces that affect this estimate derive from the context of the policy issue, organizations' knowledge of their potential allies, and, in a less direct way, particular institutional features of the group. Balanced against this estimate will be a group's concern for maintaining a distinct identity in the interest group and political communities. Methods: A probit analysis of interest groups' decisions to join coalitions or work alone is supplemented by information obtained through interviews with representatives of organized interests. Results: When a group's interest in an issue is narrow, and when a group's potential allies signal that they have little to contribute to a collective advocacy campaign, the costs of joining an alliance will likely outweigh any benefits that may accrue. But when organizations perceived to be pivotal to success are members of an alliance, and when groups represent expressive interests or perceive a strong organized opposition, the benefits of coalition appear substantial.
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Cites
Agendas and instability in American politics
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The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America
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Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
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The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe
Sabatier, P. A. (1998) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501768880000051 · Cited by 1,462
Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union
MAHONEY, C. (2007) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x07000608 · Cited by 379
Information Exchange in Policy Networks
Leifeld, P., & Schneider, V. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00580.x · Cited by 288
Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying
Lowery, D. (2007) · Polity · doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300077 · Cited by 278
Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector coalitions
Pagliari, S., & Young, K. L. (2014) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2013.819811 · Cited by 277
Metadata
- Authors
- Hojnacki, M.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1997-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 61
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2315170283
- Cited by
- 315
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 12.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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