The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union
Abstract
Scholars have avoided studying interest group influence because of the difficulty operationalising the concept. The research presented here introduces a new way of measuring lobbying success and lays out a model of its determinants. To understand why interest groups sometimes succeed and at other times fail, we must consider the institutional structure of the political system within which the advocates are operating; the characteristics of the issue at hand; and finally the characteristics of the interest group itself and their lobbying strategy. I test these factors with original data based on interviews with 149 advocates in Washington D.C. and Brussels active on a random sample of 47 policy issues. From the results, issue context emerges as a much more important determinant of lobbying success than institutional differences. The institutional differences that do emerge suggest that direct elections coupled with private campaign finance lead to winner-take-all outcomes biased in favour of wealthier business interests, while the lack of these institutional characteristics leads to more balanced policy compromises with more advocates achieving some of their policy goals.
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Cites
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
Kingdon, J. W. (1984) · Cited by 9,299
Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik
FOLLESDAL, A., & HIX, S. (2006) · JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00650.x · Cited by 1,718
The politics of attention: how government prioritizes problems
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-4321 · Cited by 1,160
Interest Groups' Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone
Hojnacki, M. (1997) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111709 · Cited by 315
Cited by
Environmental Sustainability at Work: A Call to Action
Ones, D. S., & Dilchert, S. (2012) · Industrial and Organizational Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1754-9434.2012.01478.x · Cited by 628
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308 · Cited by 367
Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology
Dür, A. (2008) · European Union Politics · doi:10.1177/1465116508095151 · Cited by 292
Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?
Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014565890 · Cited by 264
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- MAHONEY, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Policy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-01-18
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 35-56
- ISSN
- 0143-814X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-7815
- OpenAlex
- W2129302758
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 50.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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