The DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying
Abstract
Why do organized interests lobby? Answering this seemingly obvious question has become surprisingly difficult in light of recent research. One essential problem is that virtually all studies of interest organizations begin with the simplifying assumption that they are motivated actors whose prime purpose is to influence public policy. This assumption is incorrect. Rather, interest organizations are motivated actors whose primary purpose is to survive. Using this assumption, I employ niche theory and resource dependence theory to discuss how a more satisfying theory of interest representation might be constructed. This multi-goal, multi-context theory of lobbying would emphasize the importance of context in understanding organizational behavior.
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Cited by
Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology
Dür, A. (2008) · European Union Politics · doi:10.1177/1465116508095151 · Cited by 292
Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2014) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.900893 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Lowery, D.
- Venue
- Polity
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 29-54
- ISSN
- 0032-3497 (ISSN-L)
- 1744-1684
- OpenAlex
- W2093812030
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 74
- FWCI
- 20.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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