The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Politicians and Firms
Open accessAbstract
We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. We use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work, and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. We illustrate the model using examples from several countries.
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Citations
Cites
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
Leff, N. H. (1964) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/000276426400800303 · Cited by 2,568
Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies
Rimmer, D., & Bates, R. H. (1982) · African Economic History · doi:10.2307/3601228 · Cited by 1,731
MEGGINSON, W. L., NASH, R. C., & VAN RANDENBORGH, M. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05147.x · Cited by 1,415
Mueller, D. C. (1989) · Cited by 1,284
Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland
Lipton, D., & Sachs, J. (1992) · Development Policy · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-22385-5_10 · Cited by 268
Privatization: The Lessons of Experience
Kikeri, S. (1992) · Cited by 241
Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation
Bardhan, P., & Roemer, J. E. (1992) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.6.3.101 · Cited by 203
The Costs and Benefits of PrivatizationPreprint
Schmidt, K. M. (1990) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 43
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
“Moreover, the bureaucrats typically have goals that are very different from social welfare, and are dictated by their political interests (Shapiro and Willig (1990), Boycko et al. (1996), Shleifer and Vishny (1994)).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCorporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Self-citationLa Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Faccio, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806776157704 · Cited by 4,059
Metadata
- Authors
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1994-11-01
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 995-1025
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2030132760
- Cited by
- 3,336
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 93.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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