The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence
Abstract
In a rational profit-maximizing world, banks should msdntain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value projects. Why then are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit? This paper argues that rational bank managers with short horizons will set credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions. This leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by bank credit policies. Evidence from the banking crisis in New England in the early 1990s is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory.
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Cited by
Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?
Borio, C., & Zhu, H. (2012) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2011.12.003 · Cited by 1,796
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Rational herding in financial economics
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Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rajan, R. G.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1994-05-01
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 399-441
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2100670087
- Cited by
- 806
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 3.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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