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The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice
Abstract
Typically, political decision making involves the concomitant problem of deciding how to use advice. Advice can reduce uncertainty about outcomes, but it is often costly to obtain and assimilate, and is itself subject to uncertainty and error. This paper explores how a rational decision maker uses imperfect advice. Using only the assumption of utility maximization, along with a specification of exactly how knowledge and advice are "imperfect," it is possible to derive some of the initial assumptions of cognitive and bounded-rationality models. Also changes in the decision-making environment can be connected to changes in how advice is used, thereby providing theoretical predictions about political behavior. In particular it is shown here that, under certain reasonable circumstances, the rational decision maker should engage in selective exposure or "bolstering." These results do not depend upon any cost advantage or inherent value in biased advice.
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Broadbent, D. E. (1958) · doi:10.1037/10037-000 · Cited by 4,337
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Jervis, R. (2017) · doi:10.1515/9781400885114 · Cited by 3,199
Cited by
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Lupia, A. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944882 · Cited by 1,850
Dal Bo, E. (2006) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj013 · Cited by 960
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
Civic Engagements: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation
MacKuen, M., Wolak, J., Keele, L., & Marcus, G. E. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00440.x · Cited by 502
Metadata
- Authors
- Calvert, R. L.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1985-06
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 530-555
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2152537654
- Cited by
- 475
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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