Cited by 1,850Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationMedia Influence and PoliticsGame Theory and Voting Systems

Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: information and voting behavior in California insurance reform elections

Lupia, Arthur·1994·American Political Science Review

Abstract

Voters in mass elections are notorious for their apparent lack of information about relevant political matters. While some scholars argue that an electorate of well-informed voters is necessary for the production of responsive electoral outcomes, others argue that apparently ignorant voters will suffice because they can adapt their behavior to the complexity of electoral choice. To evaluate the validity of these arguments, I develop and analyze a survey of California voters who faced five complicated insurance reform ballot initiatives. I find that access to a particular class of widely available information shortcuts allowed badly informed voters to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed voters. This finding is suggestive of the conditions under which voters who lack encyclopedic information about the content of electoral debates can nevertheless use information shortcuts to vote as though they were well informed.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2944882

Cites

31 of 31 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Most citizens know relatively little about many criminal justice institutions, yet public judgments of policy interventions often emerge from limited, context-specific information.

    “In reality, most citizens know relatively little about many criminal justice institutions, yet public judgments of policy interventions often emerge from limited, context-specific information (34, 35).”

    From Does civilian oversight impact police legitimacy? (2025) · cites this paper as [34]

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Lupia, A.
Affiliations
University of California San Diego (US)
Corresponding author
Lupia, Arthur
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
1994-03
Volume
88
Issue
1
Pages
63-76
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2012728340
Cited by
1,850
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 53 · 2025: 63 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 79 · 2022: 99 · 2021: 82 · 2020: 119 · 2019: 67 · 2018: 118 · 2017: 65 · 2016: 73 · 2015: 72 · 2014: 60 · 2013: 81 · 2012: 69
FWCI
57.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
voter information, encyclopedic knowledge, voting behavior, ballot initiatives, insurance reform, California elections

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review