The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
Abstract
This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces which are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and we show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria, and hence a strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
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Cites
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Nash, J. (1989) · Cournot Oligopoly · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528231.007 · Cited by 5,595
SMITH, J. M., & PRICE, G. R. (1973) · Nature · doi:10.1038/246015a0 · Cited by 5,089
Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics
Taylor, P. D., & Jonker, L. B. (1978) · Mathematical Biosciences · doi:10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9 · Cited by 3,450
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and Linear Algebra
(1974) · Pure and Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/s0079-8169(08)x6044-1 · Cited by 3,091
Evolutionary Games in Economics
Friedman, D. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938222 · Cited by 1,939
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J.-F. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912320 · Cited by 1,397
The theory of evolution and dynamical systems
Hofbauer, J. (1988) · Cited by 1,301
Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
Harsanyi, J. C. (1973) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01737554 · Cited by 887
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Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets
Sandholm, W. H. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2696 · Cited by 448
Hao, X., Liu, G., Zhang, X., & Dong, L. (2022) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2022.121627 · Cited by 77
Hao, X., Sun, W., & Zhang, X. (2023) · Energy · doi:10.1016/j.energy.2023.128150 · Cited by 19
Hao, X., Dong, L., Liu, G., & Zhang, X. (2023) · Resources, Conservation and Recycling · doi:10.1016/j.resconrec.2023.106879 · Cited by 12
Hao, X., Dong, L., Qian, X., Benjamin, S., Wang, H., Chen, P., Wang, X., Ma, W., Li, J., Tong, X., et al. (2024) · npj Urban Sustainability · doi:10.1038/s42949-024-00179-4 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Ritzberger, K., & Weibull, J. W.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-11
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1371
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2124874567
- Cited by
- 470
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 23.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
