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Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.
Abstract
A collection of 17 essays exploring the central issues of the philosophy of the mind, and human interaction with psychology and evolutionary biology. This book questions the relationship between psychology and morality as well as exploring the concept of human intentionality. It argues that intentional attributes such as desires, goals, beliefs and knowledge are purely mechanistic. The author also considers the meaning of mental imagery, sensations, pain and other puzzling aspects of consciousness. Central to the discussion of the book is the question of whether psychology can support a vision of humans as moral agents, free to choose what they do and responsible for their actions.
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Citations
Cited by
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Nicholls, J. G. (1984) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.91.3.328 · Cited by 4,161
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
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Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Metadata
- Authors
- Harman, G., & Dennett, D. C.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1980-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2034426409
- Cited by
- 1,717
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 68.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2184867
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- Harman, G., & Dennett, D. C. (1980). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184867
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
