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Cited by 204

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

On Knowing One's Own Mind

Shoemaker, Sydney · 1988 · Philosophical Perspectives

Abstract

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ One of the views associated with Descartes is that it is of the essence of mind that each mind has a special, privileged to its own contents. Recently, I think, this view has been very much out of favor. Those who have rejected it have not, in general, denied that there is something that might be called a special access to one's own mental states. Usually they have not denied that normally a person knows of his own beliefs, desires, sensations, thoughts, etc. in a way that is utterly different from that in which one person knows of such mental states in another person. And in the case of at least some mental phenomena, in particular sensations and occurrent thoughts, it would generally be allowed that a person's to those phenomena in himself is both more comprehensive and less subject to error than his to the same sorts of phenomena in other persons. What is denied, when this Cartesian doctrine is rejected,

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Metadata

Authors
Shoemaker, S.
Venue
Philosophical Perspectives
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1988
Volume
2
Pages
183
ISSN
1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2323300907
Cited by
204
References
1
FWCI
0.53
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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