Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 578

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification

Alston, William P.·1988·Philosophical Perspectives
DOI 10.2307/2214077
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement, and with responsibility, blameworthiness, reproach, praiseworthiness, merit, being in the clear, etc. as normative conse

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2214077

Cites

12 of 12 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 12 references

Cited by

See all 578

Metadata

Authors
Alston, W. P.
Venue
Philosophical Perspectives
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1988
Volume
2
Pages
257
ISSN
1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2214077
OpenAlex
W2023446298
Cited by
578
References
12
FWCI
5.12
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2214077
The paper
Alston, W. P. (1988). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Perspectives. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214077

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.