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The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm.
Abstract
Journal Article The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm Get access The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm. By MASAHIKO AOKI. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Pp. vi + 219. £17.50 hardback.) Norman J. Ireland Norman J. Ireland University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 95, Issue 380, 1 December 1985, Pages 1109–1111, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233278 Published: 01 December 1985
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“Aoki (1990b) contrasts his "J-model" of the Japanese firm, which stresses horizontal information-sharing and network-like interactive problem-solving, with the threatened hierarchical U.”
BackgroundInfluentialTesting goodwill: conflict and cooperation in new product development networks
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ireland, N. J., & Aoki, M.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1985-12
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 380
- Pages
- 1109
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2063190275
- Cited by
- 570
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 29.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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