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Cited by 298

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies

Open access
Miller, G. · 2000 · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Abstract

The state has, since its origins, been characterized both by the production of public goods and a competition for the surplus benefits generated by the creation of those goods. Holmstrom's (1982) analysis of an impossibility result leads to the conclusion that this problem is logically inescapable. There is no process for exactly allocating the benefits of an interdependent social process that eliminates moral hazard. Furthermore, morally hazardous behavior can undermine the efficiency of the processes that generate the benefits. In both firms and states, therefore, the credible constraint of morally hazardous behavior is a fundamental concern. In both forms of social organization, delegation to bureaucracy can enhance efficiency by creating barriers between those actors with moral hazard and the producers of the benefits. The characteristics of Weberian bureaucracy, including rational/legal constraints and autonomous professional norms, serve to insulate bureaucrats from efficiency-undermining political pressures. This perspective provides support for concerns of the century-old Progressive reform tradition, which wanted to place bureaucrats “above politics”—and stands in contrast to the more recent principal/agency perspective, which argues that the fundamental problem is the creation of incentive systems that make bureaucratic subordinates increasingly responsive to the preferences of political superiors.

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Metadata

Authors
Miller, G.
Venue
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Published
2000-04-01
Volume
10
Issue
2
Pages
289-328
ISSN
  • 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
  • 1477-9803
OpenAlex
W2320381767
Cited by
298
References
36
FWCI
13.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024271
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Miller, G. (2000). Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024271

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