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Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?
Abstract
We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between factory and inspector, changes in compensation policy have surprising effects, e.g., raising the penalty for corruption may cause pollution to increase. We find that bribery is an inefficient way of encouraging the inspector to monitor; society should wipe out corruption.
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Citations
Cited by
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/345578 · Cited by 620
Baland, J.-M., Moene, K. O., & Robinson, J. A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00007-0 · Cited by 593
Tax farming redux: experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
Khan, A. Q., Khwaja, A. I., & Olken, B. A. (2016) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjv042 · Cited by 267
Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil
Zamboni, Y., & Litschig, S. (2018) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.03.008 · Cited by 151
Metadata
- Authors
- Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. P. L.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1995-01
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 428
- Pages
- 145
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2060951857
- Cited by
- 503
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 33.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2235324
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- Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. P. L. (1995). Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated? The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/2235324
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