The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Steps toward a constructive nominalism
Abstract
We do not believe in abstract entities. No one supposes that abstract entities—classes, relations, properties, etc.— exist in space-time; but we mean more than this. We renounce them altogether. We shall not forego all use of predicates and other words that are often taken to name abstract objects. We may still write ‘x is a dog,’ or ‘x is between y and z’; for here ‘is a dog’ and ‘is between … and’ can be construed as syncate-gorematic: significant in context but naming nothing. But we cannot use variables that call for abstract objects as values. In ‘x is a dog,’ only concrete objects are appropriate values of the variable. In contrast, the variable in ‘x is a zoölogical species’ calls for abstract objects as values (unless, of course, we can somehow identify the various zoological species with certain concrete objects). Any system that countenances abstract entities we deem unsatisfactory as a final philosophy.
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Citations
Cites
Notes on Existence and Necessity
Quine, W. V. O. (1943) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2017458 · Cited by 260
Self-citation
Cited by
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0198237537.001.0001 · Cited by 1,295
The logical structure of the world
Maddy, P. (2007) · Second Philosophy · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0018 · Cited by 665
A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge
Davidson, D. (2001) · Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective · doi:10.1093/0198237537.003.0010 · Cited by 658
Maddy, P. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198250754.001.0001 · Cited by 374
Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method
Maddy, P. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.001.0001 · Cited by 320
Parfit, D. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.001.0001 · Cited by 216
Metadata
- Authors
- Goodman, N., & Quine, W. V.
- Venue
- Journal of Symbolic Logic
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1947-12
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 105-122
- ISSN
- 0022-4812 (ISSN-L)
- 1943-5886
- OpenAlex
- W2057139869
- Cited by
- 503
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 2.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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