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Commitment Through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties
Abstract
The paper analyzes contracts as means of strategic commitment, that is, commitment against outside parties to the agreement. It considers the example of an incumbent firm which enters a contractual relationship with its workers in order to deter entry. It assumes away the possibility for the parties to precommit not to make Pareto-improving renegotiations of the agreement once entry has taken place. Under symmetric information, the contract is thus found to be useless for entry deterrence. If the incumbent firm or workers possess some private information, excessive post-entry production levels can however be sustained ex post, since output reductions may not be incentive compatible. While information asymmetries are usually welfare-decreasing when the goal is optimal risk sharing, they can thus be welfare-improving for the contracting parties when commitment against outsiders is the goal of the contract. The role of the renegotiation process as a constraint on sustainable agreements is stressed in the paper, and the general relevance of strategic contractual commitment is discussed.
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Cites
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
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Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models
Jullien, B. (2000) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2641 · Cited by 449
Cremer, J. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118440 · Cited by 440
Risk, managerial effort, and project choice
Hirshleifer, D., & Suh, Y. (1992) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/1042-9573(92)90004-w · Cited by 259
Metadata
- Authors
- Dewatripont, M.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-07
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 377
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079735978
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 9.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Dewatripont, M. (1988). Commitment Through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297390
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