The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
Abstract
We examine long-term wage contracts between a risk-neutral firm and a risk-averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage. A self-enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege. In the optimum self-enforcing contract, wages are sticky: they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated. They are updated by a simple rule: around each spot wage is a time invariant interval, and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval.
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Citations
Cites
Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria
Azariadis, C. (1975) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260388 · Cited by 1,262
Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand
Baily, M. N. (1974) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296397 · Cited by 893
Harris, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297359 · Cited by 812
On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
Benveniste, L. M., & Scheinkman, J. A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1910417 · Cited by 417
Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts
Holmstrom, B. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885374 · Cited by 175
Cited by
Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness
Hall, R. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828482 · Cited by 1,439
Relational Incentive Contracts
Levin, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157115 · Cited by 1,099
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
MacLeod, W. B., & Malcomson, J. M. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912562 · Cited by 766
Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment
Topa, G. (2001) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00169 · Cited by 733
Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
Kocherlakota, N. R. (1996) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297795 · Cited by 727
Metadata
- Authors
- Thomas, J., & Worrall, T.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-10
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 541
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2030243732
- Cited by
- 436
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 9.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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