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Cited by 338

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Strategic Information Revelation

Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, Postlewaite, Andrew, Suzumura, Kotaro·1990·The Review of Economic Studies
DOI 10.2307/2297541
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Abstract

We analyze the problem in which agents have non-public information and are to play an asymmetric information game. The agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game. Revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements. The equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information. Sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information. A number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games.

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Metadata

Authors
Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Postlewaite, A., & Suzumura, K.
Venue
The Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
1990-01
Volume
57
Issue
1
Pages
25
ISSN
0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2297541
OpenAlex
W1972933860
Cited by
338
References
13
FWCI
3.89
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Strategic Information Revelation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297541
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Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Postlewaite, A., & Suzumura, K. (1990). Strategic Information Revelation. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297541

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.